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Over the past several decades, the global rise 
in atmospheric carbon and changes  to the 
climate have meant continuing challenges to 
Mainers’ way of life. Experts predict elevated 
temperatures and increased precipitation and 
freeze-thaw cycles will necessitate more 
frequent repairs to Maine’s roads, culverts, 
and bridges. Such incidents could burden 
state agencies and place additional strain on 
Maine’s economy.
As climate awareness continues to grow, many 
states are taking matters into their own hands. 
In 2005, a collection of states established the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to 
curb emissions in the power sector. Using 
RGGI as a springboard, the Transportation and 
Climate Initiative (TCI) was formed five years 
later to mitigate emissions in the transporta-
tion sector. In Maine, the transportation sector 
is responsible for 53% of the state’s carbon 
dioxide emissions, making it an important 
target for emission reductions.
With the release of the final MOU, the basic 
structure of the TCI (now called the 
Transportation and Climate Initiative Program, 
or “TCI-P”) was solidified. Just four of 14 eligible 
jurisdictions signed the MOU, with eight 
states now participating in policy develop-
ment. Two states, New Hampshire and 
Maine, have opted out of formal participation 
in the TCI-P citing concerns that projected 
increases in the price of fuel would dispropor-
tionately affect rural citizens. A map of the 
TCI-P region is shown in figure 1.
This policy brief is a summary of our research 
examining the differential effects of the TCI-P 
on rural and urban households in Maine. The 
highlights of this research are presented here, 
with special attention given to changes in fuel 
consumption and CO2 emission reductions as 
well as the equity implications of the TCI-P. 
The most visible effect of the TCI-P is the 
expected economic burden of $52 to $92 per 
year for the average Maine household. Our 
findings are summarized below:
 h To determine households’ responses to 
predicted fuel price increases of 5¢ to 
9¢, we adapted short-run estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand for gasoline in 
Maine, finding a statewide (weighted) esti-
mate of -0.8737. Estimates for rural and 
Figure 1: Map of the TCI-P Region
Note: this map was created with permission from 
mapchart.net.
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urban Maine were -0.9747 and -0.7473, 
respectively. We performed sensitivity 
analyses using elasticities 50% lower and 
25% higher than these estimates.
 h Statewide adapted price elasticity esti-
mates show an average Maine household 
would reduce its consumption of gasoline 
by 1.8% to 3.3% in the short run 
depending on the change to the price of 
gasoline. Sensitivity analysis showed a 
maximum range of +/- 1.6 percentage 
points.
 h Results showed a decline of 1.8% to 3.3% 
in metric tons of CO2 from household 
gasoline emissions depending on the 
change to the price of gasoline. Sensitivity 
analysis showed a maximum range of +/- 
1.6% of total household vehicle emissions. 
 h Findings indicated the TCI-P could result 
in some disparities in economic losses 
and burdens for rural households as 
compared to urban households. 
Depending on the change in the price of 
gasoline, rural households could face 
annual economic losses of $1 to $4 and 
economic burdens of $52 to $92. Urban 
households could face annual economic 
losses of $1 to $3 and economic burdens 
of $52 to $92. Sensitivity analysis showed 
a maximum range of economic losses and 
burdens of +/- $2. The similar range of 
values suggests that price elasticity is less 
important than households’ quantity 
demanded of gasoline in determining 
economic loss and burden. On average, 
we found rural households consume 18 
more gallons per year as compared to 
urban households.
 h Disparities between rural and urban 
households are driven, in part, by differ-
ences in median household income. The 
median average income for rural house-
holds is $53,701 compared to $60,571 for 
urban households. Households were clas-
sified as rural or urban based on county 
residence.
 h Results indicated Maine may face annual 
losses in gasoline tax revenue of $3.24 
million to $5.84 million depending on the 
change in the price of gasoline. These 
figures represent short-run losses from 
changes in household consumption of 
gasoline only. Sensitivity analysis revealed 
a range of revenue losses 50% lower to 
25% higher.  
Revenues from allowance auction proceeds 
could generate $32.44 million ($32.29 to 
$32.74 million after sensitivity analysis) annu-
ally in the short-run given a 5¢ increase in the 
price of gasoline.  Given a 9¢ increase, we esti-
mated $31.95 million in auction revenues 
annually in the short-run ($31.68 million to 
$32.50 million after sensitivity analysis). These 
values assume a starting allowance price of 
$6.60 and represent revenues generated from 
household gasoline consumption only. 
Efforts to achieve the goals laid out in Maine’s 
Four-year Plan for Climate Action may 
require decision-makers to discuss how the 
TCI-P fits alongside state objectives. The 
present research can help inform this 
discussion.
Overview of the TCI-P
The TCI-P is a cap-and-invest program facili-
tated by the Georgetown Climate Center, 
aiming to reduce emissions in the transporta-
tion sector by 26% by 2032.1 As a cap-and-in-
vest program, the TCI-P sets a maximum 
quantity of emissions (in MTCO2) and auctions 
off a limited number of allowances (to be 
determined in the final Model Rule) to state 
fuel suppliers. Fuel suppliers are then required 
to hold one allowance per MTCO2 contained 
in affected fuel, which includes any retail gaso-
line and on-road diesel sold in a participating 
TCI-P jurisdiction.
When fuel suppliers purchase allowances, it is 
assumed they will try to pass all costs onto 
consumers, such that the price per gallon of 
gasoline will rise. Whether or not the full price 
of allowances is passed on depends on the 
demand and supply for gasoline and diesel. 
Recent estimates predicted a 5¢ to 9¢ increase 
in the cost per gallon of gasoline in 2023, 
assuming an allowance price of $6.60. These 
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forecasts are estimates; prices could be higher 
or lower depending on the demand for 
gasoline.
Given the potential for price variability, policy 
designers incorporated various price stabiliza-
tion mechanisms to help ensure price increases 
remain within the 5¢ to 9¢ range. Two such 
mechanisms are emissions containment 
reserves (ECRs) and cost containment reserves 
(CCRs). These mechanisms moderate price 
fluctuations by removing (in the case of the 
ECR) or introducing (in the case of the CCR) 
allowances at the appropriate time.
Prices are further stabilized by multi-year 
compliance periods, which provide fuel 
suppliers additional time to meet allowance 
obligations given year-to-year variation in 
gasoline demand. Allowance banking and 
offsets also help to stabilize prices, and each 
are permitted under the draft Model Rule so 
long as certain requirements are met. 
Investments & Benefits
When jurisdictions auction off allowances to 
fuel suppliers, this generates revenue that can 
be invested to meet TCI-P goals. These goals 
include reducing CO2 emissions in the trans-
portation sector, reducing particulate matter 
and other air pollutants, promoting economic 
growth (e.g., through job creation), and making 
clean transportation more accessible, among 
others.
While jurisdictions can allocate TCI-P proceeds 
as they see fit, the Georgetown Climate Center 
has made various recommendations to guide 
investment decisions. Based on these recom-
mendations, participating jurisdictions could 
invest in things like vehicle electrification, 
public transit, or constructing active mobility 
infrastructure (e.g., bike paths).
The way auction proceeds are invested will 
determine the kind and extent of expected 
program benefits. For example, invest-
ments that prioritize active mobility infra-
structure would result in greater health 
benefits from reduced air pollution, while 
investments prioritizing vehicle electrifica-
tion would result in greater reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Apart from health benefits, a recent 
report from the Georgetown Climate 
Center estimated that the TCI-P could 
result in a regional $590 million annual 
increase in GDP and 2,660 new jobs per 
year, assuming at least 13 eligible jurisdic-
tions participate.2 
Greater participation in the TCI-P region 
would lead to greater benefits.
Equity Implications
The TCI-P may impact some Mainers more 
than others. In an interview from December 
2020, Governor Mills noted her concern 
that increases in the price of gasoline 
would fall harder on low-income residents. 
Trucking and logging companies in Maine 
have raised similar concerns for their own 
industries.
Equity concerns such as these are not 
unique to Maine. In fact, the focus on 
equity has led to efforts on behalf of TCI-P 
policy designers to mitigate unbalanced 
impacts. The MOU, for example, requires 
that 35% of TCI-P revenues be dedicated 
to “overburdened and underserved” 
communities. It also contains a provision 
for an Equity Advisory Body to provide 
“What is ‘cap-and-invest?’”
Cap-and-invest is a term used for cap-and-
trade programs like RGGI where the 
proceeds are dedicated towards actions to 
reduce carbon emissions. In its most basic 
form, cap-and-trade entails selling a limited 
number of carbon credits to polluters who 
may either use them to cover their own 
emissions or sell them to others. 
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input and oversight on TCI-P policies, 
including on how revenues are invested.
Study Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this study was to determine 
the economic effects of the TCI-P on Maine 
households. This involved estimating multiple 
factors, including:
1. The short-run, household price elas-
ticity of demand for gasoline in rural 
and urban Maine
2. The expected change in gasoline 
consumption from the TCI-P
3. The change in CO2 emissions associ-
ated with expected changes in gaso-
line consumption
4. The economic loss and burden from 
expected reductions in household 
gasoline consumption
5. The change in tax revenues resulting 
from reductions in household gasoline 
consumption
6. The net revenue gain (after-tax) from 
allowance auction proceeds
Important to note is that we studied the TCI-P’s 
impact on household gasoline consumption 
only. We did not study the economy-wide 
impacts of the TCI-P, nor did we study the 
effects of the TCI-P on diesel consumption. 
Similarly, we did not analyze the reductions in 
CO2 emissions, economic losses and burdens, 
tax revenues, and allowance auction proceeds 
associated with diesel consumption.3
Results
Data
We collected data from the Maine Department 
of Environmental Protection (MeDEP), the 
American Community Surveys (ACSs), and the 
Georgetown Climate Center. The MeDEP 
supplied data on 2017 fuel consumption by 
vehicle type, which was instrumental in esti-
mating reductions in the household consump-
tion of gasoline. The ACSs provided the 
demographic data needed to adapt estimates 
of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline. 
The Georgetown Climate Center provided esti-
mates of the fuel price increases expected to 
result from the TCI-P. We also collected data 
from Google Maps, the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles, the Maine Department of 
Transportation, and the American Automobile 
Association for similar purposes. The 
Transportation Energy Data Book from Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory provided additional 
information needed to convert gasoline 
consumption into CO2 emissions.
Price Elasticity
The price elasticity of demand is a measure of 
one’s sensitivity to changes in the price of a 
good or service. In relation to the TCI-P, price 
elasticity represents the degree of responsive-
ness in the quantity demanded of gasoline 
expected to result from a 5¢ to 9¢ increase in 
the price of gasoline.
Since the present research sought to deter-
mine the differential effects of the TCI-P on 
rural and urban households, a separate price 
elasticity estimate was required for both 
regions. To determine these respective elastic-
ities, we adapted estimates from Spiller, 
Stephens, and Chen (2017), who divided 
households’ price elasticity into eight different 
characteristics, including:
1. Household size
2. Vehicles per household
3. Vehicle fuel economy
4. Distance to the nearest metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA)
5. Gasoline price
6. Average commute time
7. Income
8. Region (rural or urban)
Estimates are shown in abbreviated form in 
table 1 and in full in the appendix.
Perhaps the most common way to estimate 
the price elasticity of fuel demand is through 
the use of reduced-form models. These esti-
mates have typically generated short-run (1-5 
years) elasticities ranging from -0.2 to -0.3. 
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Note that the estimates used in the present 
research are higher (more elastic) in absolute 
value.
There are several reasons for this, one being 
that the study on which the present research 
was based used household-level data. Studies 
using household-level data tend to produce 
higher elasticity estimates,4 typically ranging 
from -0.43 to -0.67.
To check the validity of results, we conducted 
an asymmetric sensitivity analysis using elas-
ticities 50% lower and 25% higher than those 
given in table 1. These results are reported in 
the following subsections.
Gasoline & Emission Reductions
We estimated the change in households’ quan-
tity demanded of gasoline using the statewide 
elasticity estimate of -0.874 given above, 
assuming either a 5¢ or 9¢ increase in price. 
Estimating these factors was an important 
step toward determining the broader effects 
of the TCI-P in Maine, discussed below.
Given a 5¢ price increase, we estimated gaso-
line consumption would decline by 10.79 
million gallons (19 gal/household) in the 
short-run. Multiplied by an emission factor of 
0.008507 MTCO2/gal of gasoline,
5 this equals 
91,778 MTCO2, or a 1.8% decline in household 
vehicle emissions from gasoline. We obtained 
a range of possible gasoline and emission 
reductions through sensitivity analysis, which 
showed gasoline could decline by 5.39 million 
to 13.49 million gallons, or roughly 10 to 24 
gal/household, respectively. This corresponds 
to emission reductions of 45,889 MTCO2 (0.9%) 
to 114,723 MTCO2 (2.3%).
Given a 5¢ price increase, we estimated that 
consumption of gasoline would decline by 
19.46 million gallons (35 gal/household), or 
165,565 MTCO2 and a 3.3% reduction in house-
hold vehicle emissions from gasoline. 
Sensitivity analysis revealed declines in gaso-
line consumption ranging from 9.73 million to 
24.33 million gallons in the short-run, or 
roughly 17 to 44 gal/household, respectively. 
This corresponds to emission reductions of 
82,782 MTCO2 (1.7%) to 206,956 MTCO2 (4.1%). 
Results are summarized in table 2.
Economic Loss & Burden
We estimated economic loss and burden for 
both rural and urban households to deter-
mine the potential for heterogeneous impacts 
across different sections of the Maine popula-
tion. Economic loss represents the decline in 
consumer wellbeing when price increases 
cause households to purchase less gasoline 
than they otherwise would. Economic burden 
represents the decline in consumer wellbeing 
when households spend more per unit of 
gasoline. Economic loss and burden are illus-
trated in figure 2 below.
Results indicate little variation in either 
economic loss or burden for rural and urban 
households given the range of price elasticities 
we considered. We estimated that a 5¢ increase 
in the price of gasoline would lead rural 
households to face economic losses of just 
over $1 per year, while urban households 
would face losses of just under $1 per year. 
The economic burden for rural households 
was also comparable to that of urban house-
holds, with both facing burdens of roughly $52 
Economic burden is defined as the direct 
change in consumer wellbeing from an 
increase in price.
Economic loss is defined as the indirect 
change in consumer wellbeing from a 
reduction in market activity that house-
holds value. 
Table 1: Elasticities by region
Rural Urban Statewide
-0.975 -0.747 -0.874
Note: Adapted estimates of the price elasticity of demand for 
gasoline represent short-run (1-5 years) sensitivity in house-
hold consumption to changes in the price of gasoline. Elastic-
ities reflect a gasoline price of $2.39.
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Table 2: Gasoline and Emission Reductions
Price 
Change
Change in  
Consumption  
(millions of gallons)
Change in  
Emissions. 
(MTCO2)
% Change in 
Emissions
% Range in 
Emissions
5¢ 10.79 million 91,764 1.8% 0.9% to 2.3%
9¢ 19.46 million 165,552 3.3% 1.7% to 4.1%
Note: The first column shows two potential price increases that could result from the TCI-P. Given these price increases, the sub-
sequent columns show a range of expected gasoline and emission reduction outcomes. The final column provides a percentage 
range of emission reductions (and therefore a range in consumption) using elasticities 50% lower and 25% higher than those 
given in table 1.
Figure 2: Economic Loss and Burden
                  a.                                                                   b. 
Note: When fuel suppliers purchase allowances to cover the emissions of affected fuel, it is assumed they will attempt to pass costs 
onto households. The supply curve therefore shifts up by amount t, in proportion to the cost of allowances. As graphs a. and b. 
show, these efforts are only partially successful, as households respond by reducing their quantity demanded of gasoline. The result 
is a price increase of (Pt – P) instead of the full amount t. Thus, the cost of allowances is shared by both fuel suppliers and house-
holds, with households facing 5¢ to 9¢ increases in the price of gasoline in the case of the TCI-P. Note also that the demand curve 
is depicted as being concave to the origin. This is true only if households become more price elastic as prices rise, as suggested in 
Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017).
The upper bound of the economic (or “deadweight”) loss faced by households is shown by the yellow-shaded region in panel a. Eco-
nomic loss represents the costs associated with a reduction in market activity when the cost of gasoline rises by amount (Pt – P). The 
upper bound of the economic loss is calculated following Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017) for small, incremental changes in the 
price of gasoline, as would be expected from the TCI-P. The economic burden faced by households is shown by the yellow-shaded 
region in panel b. The economic burden represents the share of household expenditures on fuel that result from an increase in the 
price of gasoline. It is considered a more direct measure of consumer welfare than economic loss. 
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per year (approximately 2.1% of annual fuel 
costs and 0.6% of average costs of driving for 
households from either region). Given a 9¢ 
increase in the price of gasoline, we estimated 
rural households would face economic losses 
of under $4 per year, while urban households 
would face losses of under $3 per year. We 
found that the economic burden for rural 
households to be just over $92 per year in the 
short-run, and for urban households, just 
under $92 per year. These figures for the 
economic burden represent 3.6% of fuel costs 
and just over 1.0% of the total costs of driving 
for the average Maine household from either 
rural or urban Maine.
Sensitivity analysis revealed little deviation 
from these results. Given a 5¢ price increase, 
economic loss ranged from 54¢ to just over $1 
per year for rural households and 40¢ to just 
over $1 per year for urban households. 
Economic burden for a 5¢ price increase 
ranged from $52 to $53 per year for rural 
households and from $51 to $52 per year for 
urban households.
Given a 9¢ price increase, sensitivity analysis 
showed economic losses ranging from $2 to 
$4 per year for rural households and from $1 
to $3 per year for urban households. Analysis 
showed that economic burdens given a 9¢ 
price increase could range from $91 to $94 per 
year for rural households and from $91 to $93 
per year for urban households. As a percent of 
households’ fuel and total driving costs, sensi-
tivity analysis revealed no meaningful devia-
tion from initial results given a 9¢ price 
increase.
Results for economic loss and burden are 
similar for three reasons:
1. The price change expected from the 
TCI-P is relatively small.
2. While elasticity estimates differed 
substantially between rural and urban 
Maine, in this case we found elasticity 
plays a lesser role in determining 
economic loss and burden than 
households’ quantity demanded of 
gasoline. 
3. Our analysis found rural households 
consume 18 gallons more per year as 
compared to urban households.
See “Study Limitations” for more information.
State Tax Revenue
The gasoline tax in Maine is 30¢ per gallon, 
plus an additional .01¢ per gallon in fees.6 If 
households reduce their quantities demanded 
of gasoline in response to price increases, 
state tax revenues will fall proportionately.
We found that a 5¢ increase in the price of 
gasoline would result in losses of $3.24 million. 
A 9¢ increase would result in losses of $5.84 
million.
Sensitivity analysis found that a 5¢ increase in 
the price of gasoline could result in losses of 
$1.62 million to $4.05 million and that a 9¢ 
increase could result in losses ranging from 
$2.92 million to $7.30 million.
Allowance Auction Proceeds
The effects of tax revenue reductions on the 
Maine economy may be contrasted with 
auction proceeds generated by the TCI-P.7 We 
estimated the portion of proceeds expected 
from household consumption of gasoline in 
Maine.
In a recent report from the Georgetown 
Climate Center, allowances for the TCI-P were 
predicted to start at $6.60 per MTCO2 in 2023. 
Given this price, we found that the TCI-P could 
raise $31.95 million to $32.44 million annually 
depending on the change in the price of gaso-
line in the state.
Given a 5¢ increase in the price of gasoline, 
sensitivity analysis revealed that the TCI-P 
could generate auction proceeds of $32.29 
million to $32.74 million. A 9¢ increase in price 
would result in a lower stream of proceeds 
due to households’ higher elasticities and 
lower consumption of gasoline. This is an 
unexpected result arising from our high elas-
ticity estimates. Sensitivity analysis showed 
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auction proceeds could range from $31.68 
million to $32.50 million given a 9¢ price 
increase.
Responding to Equity Concerns
The TCI-P addresses important questions 
about how to cut greenhouse gas emissions in 
one of the most polluting sectors in the 
economy. However, it raises equally important 
questions about how to best serve the over-
burdened and underserved members of our 
communities. Responding to these questions 
can be challenging.
The 35% equity mandate mentioned above is 
one response that seeks to find middle ground 
between both issues. Yet questions remain as 
to how exactly this portion of auction proceeds 
should be spent.
One way to guide investments of TCI-P 
proceeds would be to follow the transporta-
tion goals already laid out in Maine’s Four-year 
Plan for Climate Action—some of which may 
effectively address equity concerns. Increasing 
the fuel economy of Maine’s vehicle fleet, for 
example, would ensure that those who drive 
the most (rural households) would receive the 
preponderance of benefits, in this case through 
reduced expenditures on gasoline. Providing 
rebates for used and new high efficiency vehi-
cles would be one way to facilitate this solu-
tion, as the Maine Climate Council 
recommended.
Expanding access to public transit is another 
goal listed in Maine’s Four-year Plan for Climate 
Action, with even greater potential to address 
equity concerns. A recent paper from 
Gillingham and Munk-Nielsen (2019) found 
that, in settings where access to public transit 
is universal, a gas tax with a uniform redistri-
bution of revenues given to each member of 
society is progressive in terms of vertical 
equity. This novel finding suggests a positive 
relationship between the accessibility of public 
transit and the progressivity of a program like 
the TCI-P.
However, expanding public transit may not be 
cost-effective in some of the most rural parts 
of the state. This solution may also fail to 
address the unequal burden rural businesses 
(particularly within the logging and trucking 
industries) would face from the TCI-P. While 
TCI-P proceeds may be used to fund rebate 
programs for more fuel-efficient trucks, these 
rebates may still prove insufficient for those 
businesses operating on the smallest margins. 
In such contexts, alternative solutions may be 
necessary to ensure the TCI-P does not create 
disproportionate impacts. Future research 
should investigate the viability of the following 
policy proposals as potential supplements to 
existing transportation goals:
1. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could 
be redistributed in the form of an 
annual tax credit to households that 
meet specific criteria: e.g., income, 
commute distance, household size.
2. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could 
be set aside to pay for tax breaks 
for industries disproportionately 
affected by the TCI-P, such as the 
logging and trucking industries in 
Maine.
3. A portion of TCI-P proceeds could 
fund the implementation of fuel-
saving technologies or other strate-
gies utilized by the Environmental 




In addition to equity concerns, several other 
considerations may guide policymakers’ deci-
sion whether or not to join the TCI-P in the 
future:
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 h The TCI-P will contribute modestly to the 
state’s mandated emission reduction 
goals of 45% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. 
 h Relatedly, the TCI-P could serve as a 
funding source to help Maine meet the 
transportation goals outlined in the Four-
year Plan for Climate Action.8 There is 
currently an annual $232 million shortfall 
in funding for transportation-related proj-
ects, and funding needs will only increase 
as the state moves to meet these goals.
 h Policymakers may consider how a patch-
work TCI-P could impact program effec-
tiveness. For example, if Maine decides to 
join the TCI-P but New Hampshire, 
Vermont, or other states do not, some 
households and interstate truckers 
could choose to fill up outside state 
borders to avoid price increases. The 
average price of motor fuel in New 
Hampshire is somewhat lower than it is 
in Maine (approximately 9¢ more per 
gallon). For truckers or households living 
on or near the New Hampshire border, 
this discrepancy may prove sufficient to 
alter consumption behavior. On the other 
hand, residents living on or near the 
Canadian border would continue 
purchasing their gasoline in Maine, as gas 
prices in the two bordering provinces of 
Quebec and New Brunswick are, based on 
current provincial averages, at least 33% 
higher.
Responding to Public Opinion
Public opinion polling from Climate Nexus 
and the Yale Program on Climate Change 
Communication (YPCCC) reported that 56% of 
Maine survey respondents expressed at least 
some support for the TCI-P, compared with 
26% that expressed at least some opposition.9 
Majority support may provide additional justi-
fication to adopt the TCI-P. Still, policymakers 
must take care in responding to the public’s 
concerns. Utilizing the following messaging 
and communication strategies may help poli-
cymakers increase public support for the 
TCI-P:
 h Maine trails a majority of states in gas tax 
rates and is ranked 27th nationally. 
Highlighting this point may soften remon-
strances over gas price increases.
 h Policymakers should transparently state 
the benefits and costs to be expected by 
both rural and urban households, as well 
as their plans to distribute them.
 h While communicating about the TCI-P, 
policymakers should: (1) emphasize the 
contemporary relevance of climate 
change, (2) appeal to social norms, and 
(3) suggest simple actions that are imple-
mentable in everyday life.
The transportation sector remains a signifi-
cant source of greenhouse gas emissions in 
Maine. While the TCI-P may contribute to the 
state’s transportation goals, its success or 
failure will largely depend on how policy-
makers address Mainers’ concerns about 
equity. Doing so will require care and inge-
nuity to develop the right policy solutions, the 
right messages, and the right communication 
strategies.  
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APPENDIX: Short-run Weighted Elasticities by 
Household Characteristic
Maine Average Elasticity Estimate
Category Maine Average Weights ŋ
Household size 2.33 9.5% -0.77030
Vehicles per household 2.06 13.5% -0.84710
Average MPG  21.76 13.5% -0.89745
Distance to MSA 59.99 km 9.5% -1.61901
Gasoline price 2.39 13.5% -0.60031
Average commute 24 min. 13.5% -0.87400
Household income $55,425 13.5% -0.72557
Rural or urban? Both 13.5% -0.84622
Weighted average 100.00% -0.87372
Maine Rural Elasticity Estimate
Category Rural Average Weights ŋ
Household size 2.32 9.50% -0.76920
Vehicles per household 2.06 13.50% -0.84710
Average MPG 21.76 13.50% -0.89745
Distance to MSA 80.97 km 9.50% -2.50770
Gasoline price $2.39 13.50% -0.60031
Average commute 24.73 min. 13.50% -0.87984
Household income $53,700.96 13.50% -0.71109
Rural or urban? Rural 13.50% -0.97800
Weighted average 100.00% -0.97467
Maine Urban Elasticity Estimate
Category Urban average Weights ŋ
Household size 2.35 9.50% -0.77250
Vehicles per household 2.06 13.50% -0.84710
Average MPG 21.76 13.50% -0.89745
Distance to MSA 30.16 km 9.50% -0.50500
Gasoline price $2.39 13.50% -0.60031
Average commute 22.96 min. 13.50% -0.86568
Household income $60,571.24 13.50% -0 .76716
Rural or urban? Urban 13.50% -0.65900
Weighted average 100.00% -0.74732
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Methods
Methods centered around in two main areas: (1) creating a classification scheme for rural and 
urban households and (2) adapting short-run estimates of rural and urban households’ price 
elasticity of demand for gasoline.
The rural/urban classification schemed was based largely on definitions from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, which considers an “urbanized area” to contain 50,000 or more people. In the present 
research, Maine’s three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (Bangor, Portland-South Portland, 
and Lewiston-Auburn) were used as proxies for Maine’s urbanized areas, which are identical 
excepting the cities of South Portland and Auburn. Specifically, households located within coun-
ties containing the principal cities of each MSA were considered “urban,” whereas households 
located outside these counties were considered “rural.” As such, Androscoggin, Cumberland, and 
Penobscot counties were all classified as “urban,” while Aroostook, Franklin, Hancock, Kennebec, 
Knox, Lincoln, Oxford, Piscataquis, Sagadahoc, Somerset, Waldo, Washington, and York counties 
were classified as “rural.” See the sidebar titled “Study Limitations” for a discussion of how this 
classification scheme impacted study results. 
As described above, estimates of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline were modified 
according to eight different household characteristics, including:
 h Household Size. Household size for rural and urban Maine was determined by summing the 
weighted average household sizes in each county according to their rural and urban desig-
nation. Counties were weighted according to their relative share of the rural or urban 
population.
 h Vehicles Per Household (VPHs). The VPHs characteristic was calculated by dividing the number 
of registered household vehicles by the number of households in Maine.
 h Average Fuel Economy (MPG). MPG was calculated in several steps. First, an average vehicle 
miles traveled (VMTs) estimate from the Maine Department of Transportation was multi-
plied by the number of licensed drivers to estimate total annual VMTs in Maine. This value 
was then divided by the total number of gallons of motor fuel consumed by Maine house-
holds in 2017 (including gasoline and diesel).
 h Distance to the Nearest MSA. Distance to the nearest MSA for rural and urban Maine was 
calculated by summing the weighted distances (in kilometers) from the center of population 
of each county to the closest MSA. Distance was weighted according to each county’s rela-
tive share of the rural or urban population.
 h Gasoline Price. Gasoline price information was obtained from the American Automobile 
Association. 
 h Commute Distance. Household commute distance for rural and urban Maine was obtained 
at the county level from the American Community Survey 5-year estimates from 2014-2018 
and was weighted according to county population. 
 h Median Household Income. Median household income for rural and urban Maine was calcu-
lated in the same way as the “commute distance” characteristic.
 h Rural Versus Urban. The classification scheme used to discriminate between rural and urban 
Maine is described above.




Several limitations impact the findings of this study. The first is the lack of ideal data for the esti-
mation of three household-specific characteristics (vehicles per household, MPG, and town-spe-
cific gasoline prices) for rural and urban Maine. We used statewide averages instead, as shown 
in the appendix.
Another limitation is a lack of definitive guidance on the relative importance of household char-
acteristics in determining a household’s sensitivity to changes in the price of gasoline. However, 
as sensitivity results show, this is not likely to have an important impact on our equity 
calculations. 
A final limitation is the method we used to differentiate between rural and urban households. 
This method resulted in less variability in individual households’ quantity demanded of gasoline 
than may exist in practice, considering the potential for underlying variability in household 
behavior. Our method of classifying households, while useful for highlighting differential effects, 
tends to underestimate the economic impacts of the TCI-P on rural households that drive long 
distances.
To illustrate, we calculated the economic burden for households that consume 25% more and 
25% less gasoline than the average Maine household. The average household consumed 1,057 
gallons of gasoline in 2017. Using the statewide elasticity estimate of -0.8737, we found that 
households who consume 25% more gasoline (1321 gal/yr.) would face a short-run, annual 
economic burden of $65 to $115 depending on a 5¢ or 9¢ increase in the price of gasoline, 
respectively. Households who consume 25% less gasoline (793 gal/yr.) would face an economic 
burden of $39 to $69 depending on a 5¢ or 9¢ price increase, respectively.
We believe, and the numbers confirm, that a household’s burden from the TCI-P will be driven 
mainly by its VMTs, not its degree of sensitivity to changes in the price of gasoline.
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Endnotes
1 Recent modeling results predict that emissions in the transportation sector will decline by 24.3% whether states 
join the TCI-P or not.
2 At the time, North Carolina was not eligible to participate. These figures therefore assume participation of 
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
3 The reason for excluding economy-wide effects of the TCI-P should be clear from the study purpose given 
above. Excluding the effects associated with diesel consumption was deliberate and motivated by the fact that 
diesel comprises just 2.1% of households’ consumption of motor fuel in Maine. Calculating the effects associated 
with diesel consumption would have also required a customizable estimate of the price elasticity of demand for 
diesel fuel at the household level, information that was unavailable at the time of this study.
4 This claim is based on research from Graham and Glaister (2002), as cited by Spiller, Stephens, and Chen (2017).
5 The emission factor used in this study was calculated by multiplying the amount of carbon in a gallon of E10 
(2,347 grams) by the ratio of molecular weights for carbon and CO2 (44/12). This number was then divided by 
1,000,000 so that it could be expressed in metric tons.
6 The 30¢ gas tax can be found in 36 M.R.S. §2903(1) (2019). The .01¢ fee can be found in 38 M.R.S. §551(4A-1) 
(2015).
7 It is important to note restrictions on TCI-P revenue allocation will likely preclude replacing losses to the General 
Highway Fund arising from decreased gasoline tax revenues.
8 While the TCI-P would generate revenues for clean transportation-related projects, policymakers should weigh 
these revenues against so-called “leaky bucket” costs associated with revenue transfers. These costs include 
things like the distortionary effects of taxes (to the extent that the TCI-P functions as a tax) and the administra-
tive costs associated with the distribution of benefits.
9 Margin of error = +/- 6-9%.
